We believe in the
great significance of upstanding Jews’ common practices and in looking for
halachic justification for them. However, there has to be a good fit between
sources/logic and the practices.
The gemara
(Kiddushin 31b) gives examples of kibbud (honoring) for parents
and of mora (awe). While standing is not on either list, it is evident
from gemarot that it is expected (see Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah 240). This
is logical considering the mitzva from the Torah (Yayikra 19:32) to
stand before old people and scholars (Kiddushin 32b).
R. Yannai (ibid. 33b)
says that a talmid chacham is not permitted to stand for his
rebbe more than once in the morning and in the evening to avoid giving
to him more honor than to Hashem. The Rif does
not cite this ruling, and the Rosh (Kiddushin 1:56) explains (and agrees) that
the gemara’s subsequent discussion indicates that his idea is rejected.
The Rambam (Talmud Torah 6:8) does accept R. Yannai. The Shulchan Aruch (and,
therefore, Sephardim- see Yalkut Yosef, Kibbud Av 4:8) rules like the Rif/Rosh.
The Rama (YD 242:16)
accepts R. Yannai, but not according to its simple reading; one is not
obligated more than twice a day, but he may do more (see Darchei
Moshe YD 242:11; Semag, Aseh 13). Most Acharonim (see Chayei Adam 67:7; Shevet
Halevi II:111; Yalkut Yosef ibid.) assume that the exemption applies to parents
also. The Aruch Hashulchan (YD 240:24) suggests that the obligation to stand for
one’s parent may exceed that toward his rebbe.
It is difficult to
demonstrate how the Rama’s opinion would justify the common practice of laxity
about standing up for parents. After all, do people think about whether they
already stood for their parent that day? The Rama can still help,
depending on the following chakira about his opinion. Must one
stand at the first opportunity of the day, after which there is an
exemption, or should there just be a mode of behavior in which he is expected to
stand roughly once in the morning and once at night? This might depend on if
standing is part of the positive kibbud, making the exact timing less
crucial, or the more negative mora, in which case without an exemption,
remaining seated is an aveira (Yalkut Yosef ibid. is unsure to which
category it applies). This, of course, helps only if the child stands with some
regularity, which is not always be the case.
Another minimizing
opinion found in the Aruch Hashulchan (ibid.) is that standing only applies when
a parent comes in from outside the house, not when he moves from place to place
in the home.
The most plausible
explanation for the practice of laxity is the idea that a parent can be
mochel (waive rights to) kibbud (Kiddushin 32a). (Regarding
being mochel requirements of mora, see Living the Halachic
Process III, G-4.) In our times, parents do not usually expect their children to
stand up in their honor and often do not find it to even be positive. If that is
the case in a specific household, then the child is indeed not required to
stand.
Let us clarify a few
things. Even after their mechila, it is a mitzva to
stand for parents (Pitchei Teshuva, YD 240:16). Some say that one has to make
some gesture of respectful acknowledgement (see Kiddushin 32b). If the reason
parents are mochel starts from the children (i.e., the parents are so
used to their not standing that they no longer demand or expect), this is not a
good thing. Therefore, it is, in most cases, better for children
(of all ages) who try to do things properly to stand for their parents more than
is presently common.
[Machon Eretz Chemdah]
